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THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY TRIBUNAL: ACHIEVING
EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN CABLE AND
COPYRIGHT INTERESTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal ["CRT", "Tribunal"] is one of
the most unusual federal agencies ever created.' It is a regulatory au-
thority with a total staff of ten people and a mandate from Congress in
Section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976,2 inter alia, to distribute mil-
lions of dollars3 generated by cable television systems' compulsory li-
cense fees to copyright owners.4 To fulfill this mandate the CRT has
just concluded its first cycle of cable royalty distribution proceedings.'
1. See Brylawski, The Copyright Royally Tribunal, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1265 (1977)
[hereinafter Brylawski]; Temple, The Copyright Royally Tribunal- New Arenafor Communi-
cations Industry Confrontation, 10 PERFORMING ARTS REV. 257 (1980) [hereinafter Temple].
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976). See also, 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 116(b) and (c), and 118
(1976). [The Copyright Royalty Tribunal will be referred to hereinafter as "Tribunal" or
"CRr'.]
2. Brylawski, supra, note 1. 17 U.S.C. § III(d).
3. 45 Fed. Reg. 50, 621 (1980). In the Federal Register of July 30, 1980, the CRT an-
nounced its first distribution of cable royalty fees, $14,644,871.44 due from the cable televi-
sion industry for 1978. See, e.g., Adding Insult to Injury: CRT Gives Only 3.25% to
Broadcasters, BROADCASTING, Aug. 4, 1980, at 28.
4. See Greene, Provisions of the Revised Copyright Act, 27 CATH. L. REV. 263 (1978)
[hereinafter Greene].
One of the major limitations on the rights of the copyright owner is the impo-
sition of the compulsory license, which will eliminate the market place determina-
don of royalty payments for the cable industry. The mechanism requires the
granting of a license in exchange for royalty payments as determined by a fee
schedule. Accordingly, a copyright owner cannot withhold his material from a
cable system so long as the system complies with the requirements for the license.
To this extent, the compulsory license severely limits the copyright owner's control
of his material and effectively removes the licensing process from the marketplace
of supply and demand. The use of a compulsory license was instituted for practical
reasons. The House Report recognized the impracticality of requiring every cable
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was distributed by a
cable system. A compulsory license will be granted "for the retransmission of
those over-the-air broadcast signals that a cable system is authorized to carry pur-
suant to the rules and regulations of the FCC." (H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 89 (1976)). Specifically, the Copyright Act focuses on cable system liabil-
ity for the use of distant signal programs which most severely affect the program
distribution market.
Id. at 281-82 (footnotes omitted other than inserted citation in n.75).
5. See note 3 supra. The CRT regulates key elements of three other compulsory
licenses as well: a "mechanical" compulsory license for making recordings of copyrighted
musical compositions, § 115; a jukebox compulsory license for performance of nondramatic
musical works, § 116; and an educational broadcasting compulsory license for performance
and recordings of published nondramatic musical compositions and displays of pictorial,
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The new agency is the result of a compromise between the cable
industry and copyright owners over the bitterly contested issue of copy-
right liability of cable television for its retransmission of copyrighted
broadcast programming.6
The battle is not over. Unanticipated technological and regulatory
changes in the cable field7 since the passage of the Act will again force
the cable-copyright issue before Congress. 8 As the debate recurs, it will
be imperative to know how well the CRT has functioned under the
scheme set forth in the Act.
This comment will briefly trace the communications developments
that led to creation of the CRT. It will then assess the workings of the
Tribunal with discussion of five areas9 of needed change in the cable-
copyright area, in the hope of stimulating legislative "fine tuning" to
mitigate these perceived weaknesses.
graphic and sculptural works, § I 18. See generally, 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.11 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). Given that prices fixed by statute, although viewed as equita-
ble at the time a law is passed, may be seen as unfair to one member of the agreement or the
other when economic change occurs, some means of reviewing and changing the compulsory
license is necessary. Congress created the CRT to fulfill this purpose and also to settle dis-
putes concerning the distribution of cable and jukebox royalties. See Korman & Koenig-
sberg, The First Proceeding Before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, I COM. AND L. 15, 17
(1979) [hereinafter Korman].
Of the four compulsory licenses regulated by the CRT, this comment focuses only on
those CRT proceedings concerning the compulsory license of cable television systems for
secondary transmissions. The first cable television distribution determination proceeding
concerning distribution of cable royalty fees for secondary transmissions was announced on
September 23, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026 (1980).
6. See Brennan, Legislative History and Chapter I of S. 22, 22 N.Y.L.Sc H. L. REv. 193,
204 (1976) [hereinafter History]; see notes 19-20 and accompanying text infra. Copyright
Issues Cable Television and Performance Rights: Hearings on Cable Television and the Com-
pulsory License Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice ofthe House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979) (statement
by Barbara Ringer) [hereinafter Ringer].
Throughout the 23-year process leading to enactment of the new copyright
law of the United States, the single most difficult issue was the/question of the
copyright liability of cable television systems for their retransission of copy-
righted broadcast programming. Congress was called upon to chart an entirely
unexplored course through a complex maze of controversial, complex, and volatile
copyright and communications issues. To have enacted any legislation that has
proved to be coherent and workable was an achievement of historic proportions.
Id. at 17.
7. Ringer, supra note 6, at 22. See also, FCC Now All But Out of Cable Business,
BROADCASTING, Jul. 28, 1980; The State ofthe Superstations, BROADCASTING, July 23, 1979;
Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Marketplace Model, 2
CoMM/ENT 477, 480 (1980); and text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS
LEADING TO THE CREATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY
TRIBUNAL
Broadcast forces were successful for years in convincing the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) that cable transmission
posed a potential threat to the viewing public because it might dilute
the network's signal.' 0 Under the belief that it was carrying out the
mandate of the Communications Act of 1934 to protect the viewing
public," the FCC seriously curtailed cable development.'
2
The Supreme Court removed these constraints in two important
cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. , 3 and Tele-
prompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc. "4 In both of these cases, the Court held
cable systems free from copyright liability for network programs they
retransmitted, stating that retransmission lacked originality and there-
fore cable was serving as a mere passive conduit for rebroadcast."5
10. See 71 F.C.C. 2d 951 (1979).
In February 1972, the Commission adopted the Cable Television Report and
Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1972), a comprehensive regulatory program for cable
television intended to permit one group of consumers, cable subscribers, to receive
additional services through the relatively new technological medium of cable tele-
vision without subjecting other consumers of video and information services, off-
the-air television viewers, to unacceptably high risks of decreased local television
broadcast service which, we feared, might follow from the unrestricted importation
of distant television broadcast signals by cable systems. Among the restrictions
adopted by the Commission in that decision were cable television syndicated pro-
gram exclusivity rules which provided protection for the nonnetwork programming
of television stations in the major markets. The rationale for their adoption was
that they were necessary "to protect local broadcasters and to insure the continued
supply of television programming."
Id. at 951-52.
I1. Id. at 640; see Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in sec-
tions of 18, 47 U.S.C., especially 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609).
12. Id. at 949.
13. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
14. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
15. Id. at 405; see also, Greene, supra note 4, at 263-64.
Copyright law is founded upon the premise that, for a limited period of time,
authors and creators of intellectual works have the exclusive right to their products.
This right can be sold or distributed as the creators wish, and those seeking use of
copyrighted material must negotiate a satisfactory royalty payment with the copy-
right owner. As a result of judicial interpretations of the Copyright Act of 1909, [in
the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions] the cable television industry was not
obligated to make royalty payments to copyright owners for the privilege of carry-
ing their programs to subscribers in other television markets. For twenty-five
years, the cable industry has flourished by picking up broadcast signals from dis-
tant television markets and retransmitting them by wire to subscribers who pay a
monthly fee for this service. Historically, the cable industry has been almost en-
tirely dependent upon the retransmission of broadcast signals for its service, and it
is this carriage of distant broadcast signals which is at the center of the ongoing
cable-copyright controversy. (footnotes omitted).
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Since these decisions cable has been steadily growing. 6
In 1972, after a four year freeze on cable development by the
FCC, 7 the cable industry was allowed to continue its growth, though
strictly saddled with special rules to prevent its infringement of the
broadcasters' domain.'" The FCC rules of 1972 and several copyright
revision bills between 1974 and 1976 were based on the expectation
that cable operators would be required to pay copyright royalties.
Great controversy surrounded this agreement to pay royalties. In
April, 1976, a compromise was reached between the "two industries
most directly affected by the establishment of copyright royalties for
cable television systems,"' 9 the National Cable Television Association
[NCTA] and the Motion Picture Association of America [MPAA]. The
provisions dealing with cable television in the Copyright Act of 1976
are based on this compromise agreement.20
A fundamental change in the new Copyright Act, effective January
1, 1978, is the requirement of compulsory license fees for all cable sys-
tems.2" The compulsory license for.cable systems in Section 11 of the
Act is a statutory device imposing prescribed royalties, payable to the
Copyright Office, in exchange for permitting cable retransmission of
copyrighted material without consent of the copyright owner.22
Id.
16. See Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television-A Signal of Change, 24
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1976). See also Greene, supra note 4, at 270.
17. Id.;.see also Ringer, supra note 6 at 18, 28. See also D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION
AND THE FCC (1973); and Greene, supra note 4, at 274.
18. See 36 F.C.C. 2d at 284-86. The FCC initiated the syndicated program exclusivity
rules. "They are ... the most complex, least understood, and most controversial provisions
of the cable rules." Greene, supra note 4, at 277.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 90 (1976); see also, Agreement Between
NCTA and MPA,4 as to Terms of Copyright Legislation, Hearing Before the Committee on
Courts, CivilLiberties andAdministration of Justice ofthe Judiciary ofthe House o/Represent-
ati'es, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976), republished in 16 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY 2188-90 (G. Grossman 6d. 1976) [hereinafter Grossman].
20. Ringer, supra note 6 at 18. See also Temple, supra note I at 268-273.
21. The compulsory license is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the new copy-
right law. It undercuts the basic constitutional principle of vesting exclusive rights in the
creator of an original expression. With the compulsory license, users are guaranteed access
to an entire body of available work without individual negotiation, provided they pay for a
general license. Congress believed that as regards use by cable television stations of distant
signal programming, there was simply no time for individual negotiation. The compulsory
license solution was conceived to balance the competing claims of the owners of copyrighted
materials and the cable users of these works. See Greene, supra note 4. See also Goldstein,
Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Lim-
its of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107 (1977).
22. Id.; There are strong arguments against the compulsory license as a means of com-
pensation to the copyright owner. Because direct returns based on individual program
[Vol. I
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Congress needed a mechanism for managing the fees and distrib-
uting them to copyright owners, therefore, it created a new legal entity,
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.23 Given the importance of compul-
sory licenses and the impact the CRT's decisions may have in other
areas, the CRT immediately became "a major force in the copyright
world."'24
III. THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF THE COPYRIGHT
ROYALTY TRIBUNAL
The CRT's structure was shaped by three distinct political realities
in Congress:
(1) Cable had become a potent political lobby, with nationwide
grassroots support.25  Additionally, cable forces were successful in
worth are not possible, the compulsory license may lessen the incentive to produce diverse,
high quality programming. The Senate Subcommittee holding hearings on the new copy-
right bill determined, however, that the concept of full copyright liability was unworkable
and that the compulsory license was preferable. S. BESEN, W. MANNING JR. & B. MITCH-
ELL, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR CABLE TELEVISION: IS COMPULSORY LICENSING THE SO-
LUTION? (1977). See History, supra note 6, at 196. See also Schaffer, Are the Compulsory
License Provisions of the Copyright Law Unconstitutional?, 2 COM. AND L. 1 (1980).
23. Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles the CA TV-Copyright
Knot, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 565 (1977).
24. Korman, supra note 5 at 15, 16 (1979); Brennan, Some Observations on Revision of
the Cop yright Law From the Legislative Point of View, 24 BULL COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 151, 153
(1977) [hereinafter Observations].
25. See Observations, supra note 24, at 151-52. See also, Brennan, infra note 42.
[T]he cable industry has tremendous political influence ....
The new development in Congress is that one of the channels available
on a cable system is "cable span" and this . . . allows the live proceedings of the
House of Representatives to be made available in most congressional districts.
This has been a development of the past three years that started with a limited
number of Congressional districts. The service now extends into well over half the
congressional districts.
Each time they add a new district, the first day the service is in operation
... the local members of Congress from that area get up and make a speech
praising the cable television industry for making it possible to bring [in the] live
proceedings of the House ....
Try to balance cable's political power off against the movie companies' and
the broadcasters'. How many movie companies are there in Kansas? . . . [Y]ou
only have two, three or four broadcasters in the average congressional district and
you have thousands of cable subscribers. Whenever anything [goes) badly for
cable, as in the early seventies when decisions were being made about rights to
sporting events, a cable operator [comes] on at the end of the television show and
say[s], "We have just transmitted this sporting event. We hope to be allowed to
continue to do so. There is now pending in Congress bill S. -. This bill would
interfere with our ability to do so and if you are concerned. . . please write your
members of Congress and let them know how you feel. ..
T . he political influence of cable in Congress is absolutely. . . great. ...
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greatly reducing the cable industry's royalty fee from what had been
initially proposed26 as well as wresting full jurisdiction over rate sched-
ules from the CRT. Thus the CRT cannot alter the basic cable televi-
sion fee schedule once it is established by Congress,27 unlike its carte
blanche authority to determine fee schedules in other areas where it
regulates. 28 Congressional amendment is necessary before the cable in-
dustry's statutory royalty fee schedule can be adjusted.29
id.
26. Hearings on ProposedAdoption of the Communications Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R.
3333 Before the Subcommittee on Communications, of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 12, 1979) (statement of Thomas C. Brennan)
[hereinafter Testimony].
27. Id. at 65.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 111, 801(b)(1)(2), 90 Stat. 2550 (1976) (now codified in 17
U.S.C. §§ 11, 801, respectively); Testimony, supra note 26 at 65.
The original intent of the sponsor of the copyright revision bill for an early
objective review, and possible adjustment, of the cable rates does not survive in the
enacted legislation. In all the other statutory licenses, the Tribunal has full juris-
diction to review and possibly adjust the rates based on the record developed dur-
ing the Tribunal's proceedings. The cable industry successfully persuaded the
Congress that if the Tribunal could review the basic schedule it would result in
financial institutions declining to make loans for the development of the cable in-
dustry. Since copyright fees will always remain one of the smaller operating costs
of a cable system, I found this argument much less persuasive than the Congress
apparently did.
Id.
29. There is a dearth of Congressional reporting concerning formation of the CRT. See
notes 36-37 and accompanying text infra. See also CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OM-
NIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES (1973), for an expla-
nation on lack of legislative material on the CRT prior to the 94th Congress.
There was no comparable provision to a Copyright Royalty Tribunal in the
1909 Act and none was included in the bill passed by the House of Representatives
in 1967. The proposal to create a Copyright Royalty Tribunal was first introduced
in December, 1969, when the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights reported out an amended version of the House-passed bill [S. 543, 9 1st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)]. Since the full Senate Committee never approved the Sub-
committee text, there was no committee report on the measure. Thus, while the bill
(with the tribunal) was reintroduced in the 93rd Congress as S. 1361, the record
does not show the Committee's intent in establishing the tribunal. An analysis of
the pertinent provisions of the tribunal must be drawn, therefore, from the text of
the bill itself ....
Id. at 157.
The 94th Congress did not significantly augment the available body of legislative data
on the CRT, and almost no mention appears on the Tribunal in the Committee Reports.
The version of the Copyright Revision bill which the Senate finally passed on February 19,
1979 simply included the CRT in the same essential form in which it was initially conceived
[See S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976)].
When the Senate bill reached the House, several major structural changes were made in
the Tribunal, primarily in changing it from a temporary body with a series of panels that
would convene only when necessary, to a permanent agency. But the House Report does
not comment on this change [See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1976)]. The
Conference Committee report adopts the House structure for the Tribunal as a permanent
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(2) Congress was opposed to creating a large or more complex
regulatory structure.30 The CRT was to have a "bare bones" construe-
tion that avoided waste, frills, drawn out studies,3' or the "bigness"
which characterizes the FCC32 and its highly intricate regulations.
33
The royalty fee distribution was not regarded by Congress as simi-
lar to a rate hearing, where due process requirements would apply, but
rather as a gift to copyright proprietors. 34 There is a spartan, almost
simplistic tone in the legislative language that inherently requires fru-
gality.3'
This implicit policy is reflected in a notable absence of guidelines
regarding how the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is to function.36 Little
comment appears in the congressional committee reports and no hear-
ings on its creation or operation were held.37 The lack of explicit provi-
sions was apparently based on the hope that no governmental
intervention on the part of the CRT would be required, presumably
since Congress anticipated industry formation of a cooperative or rep-
resentative organization.38
The Act encourages private agreements among the copyright own-
ers regarding distribution of royalty fees by inclusion of a statutory an-
titrust exemption which allows parties to negotiate a private agreement.
But, should a controversy exist concerning royalty fee distributions, the
CRT determines the formula.39 Furthermore, if the Tribunal must re-
agency within the Legislative Branch and makes additional changes, but adds no explana-
tory background on congressional intent in establishing the CRT. (See H.R. REp. No. 1733,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)].
The author has supplemented the sparse available body of Congressional reporting as
regards creation of the Tribunal by conducting interviews with key "insiders." See infra,
Fong, note 32, Johnson, note 34, Brennan, note 42, and Lehman, note 83.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2)(B) and (C) (1976). Adjustment of the royalty rates is permit-
ted at an earlier time if the FCC amends its rules, as has recently occurred.
31. See Observations, supra note 24, at 153.
32. Interview with Hiram L. Fong, former United States Senator from Hawaii, and
Manager on the Part of the Senate for P.L. 94-553, General Revision of the Copyright Law,
in Honolulu, Hawaii (Dec. 31, 1980).
33. Id.; 71 F.C.C. 2d 951 (1979).
34. Interview with William H. Johnson, Chief, Policy Review and Development Divi-
sion, Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 21, 1980) [hereinafter Johnson].
35. Id. "Here is the pot (of money). Here are ten staffers. This is your whole agency.
Make a decision within one year on how to distribute the proceeds." Id.
36. Brylawski, supra note I, at 1265.
37. Id See also Grossman, supra note 19 at 1824-29, 1834, 1886-87, for discussion on
the CRT that did occur.
38. Brylawski, supra note I at 1265.
39. Brennan, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 196 (1978).
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solve a controversy between claimants regarding distribution of funds,
the cost of the proceeding will first be deducted from the royalty pro-
ceeds in dispute.
40
(3) A potential separation of powers problem4' confronted Con-
gress as a result of the original Senate version of the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal. The Senate bill had called for an ad hoc system of panelists
temporarily appointed by the Register of Copyrights for the duration of
each proceeding.42 Based on the quasi-executive powers of the Tribu-
nal, members of the House subcommittee dealing with copyright were
concerned 43 that appointment of Tribunal members by the Register of
Copyrights was to risk reversal by a court for violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.4'
A permanent membership for the Tribunal was chosen instead,45
with nominations by the President and approval by the Senate, result-
ing in a completely self-sustaining agency. The Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal is outside the domain of the Executive Branch or any other
agency.46 In fact, precisely because of its complete independence, the
CRT is "somewhat vulnerable. 47
40. Testimony, supra note 26 at 7. "The full cost of any ... distribution proceeding
must be deducted by the Tribunal ...."
41. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The legislative branch may not exercise
executive authority by retaining power to appoint those who execute its laws, or it violates
Article I1, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this princi-
ple in Buckley by holding that Congress had violated Article 11 in providing that the Presi-
dent pro tern of the Senate and the Speaker of the House were to appoint a majority of the
voting members of the Federal Election Commission. The Court held that Commission
members could not exercise the executive-like functions of administering the law, since they
had not been appointed by the President in accordance with the power granted the President
under Article II. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 213
(1977).
42. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 802 (1969); Interview with Thomas C. Brennan,
Senior Commissioner, Copyright Royalty Tribunal; Former Chief Counsel to the Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights which processed the copyright revision bill;
Brennan drafted much of the final language of the 1976 Copyright Act; in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 22, 1980) [hereinafter Brennan].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Korman, supra note 5, at 23.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1976).
47. Ringer, supra note 6 at 38.
Mr. [George E.] Danielson [California]. How about the independence of the
CRT?. Does it have sufficient independence so far as you can observe?
Ms. Ringer. Yes, sir, it is somewhat vulnerable because it is so independent,
but I do think this decision that your subcommittee made, to make it completely
self-sustaining, not put it under any executive branch or other agency, was proba-
bly a wise one.
.d. at 38.
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IV. KEY CHANGES IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS SINCE CREATION
OF THE TRIBUNAL
Two dramatic changes in the cable-copyright equation have oc-
curred since the Copyright Act was signed into law.4 8 These include
the advent of satellite-distributed television "superstations,"49 and FCC
deregulation of its distant signal" and syndicated program exclusivity
rules." Copyright owners argue that Congress never anticipated such
revolutionary events when it arrived at the CRT's schedule of compul-
sory license fees,5 2 and therefore revamping the cable television por-
tions of the Act is essential.
Section 1 I I provides that a change in FCC rules is one of the situ-
ations where the CRT is given authority to adjust the cable royalty
rates.5 3 This jurisdiction, however, is tied to the current fee schedule
established by Congress and must therefore also reflect the judgment
Congress made as to what it felt was a reasonable fee schedule.5 4 Thus,
the statutory grant of jurisdiction in Section I I may not be an ade-
quate means of compensation to copyright owners."5
48. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
49. Id.; See also Going Super With Ted, NEWSWEEK, Jan. i, 1979 at 1; Variety, Mar. 7,
1979 at 1. United Video, Inc., 44 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d 1217 (1978).
50. Brown, Substantial Deregulation ofthe Industry. FCC Expands Cable TI"s Program-
ming, Wall St. J., Jul. 23, 1980, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
51. Id.
52. FCC Now" All But Out of Cable Business, BROADCASTING, Jul. 28, 1980, at 25.
53. Greene, supra note 4, at 293; § 801(b)(2)(B) and (C). See also note 55 infra.
54. § 801(b)(2)(B) and (C); Brennan, supra note 42.
The statute provides that if the FCC amends its rules or regulations in regard
to distant signal carriage and program exclusivity, then any copyright owner who
believes he is adversely affected by these FCC developments may file a petition
with the CRT requesting us to conduct a rate proceeding to make an appropnate
adjustment in the fee schedule. But there are several limitations and a number of
problems ....
Let's assume that prior to the recent FCC action a cable operator was allowed
to carry two distant signals. If it is not reversed in court, under the new Act he may
carry as many distant signals as he thinks is wise in terms of his operation. Assume
that he makes a judgment that he only wants to carry one additional signal. He's
paying what the broadcasters regard as a very nominal fee for the two signals that
he's been carrying for these past years under the new Copyright Act. Could the
CRT possibly adopt a fee schedule which would require him to pay more for the
one signal than he has been paying for the two that he has been carrying all these
years?
Theoretically we are authorized to respond to FCC rule changes. . .but we
must reflect the judgment that Congress made as to what it felt was a reasonable
fee schedule. . . .Although technically we are allowed to do whatever we feel is
justified, as based on the record in our proceedings. . . if the existing schedule has
been distorted because of political action in the Congress, the CRT is bound.
There are thus deficiencies in this area in the scope of CRT jurisdiction.
ld.
55. Interview with Fritz E. Attaway, Vice President, Administrative Affairs, Motion Pic-
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JO URNAL
The advent of superstations and FCC cable deregulation have in-
creased the polarization on each side of the cable-copyright issue. 6
Whereas in the past distant signal importation rules might have re-
sulted in importation of two or three signals, cable television systems
may now bring in as many signals as they find economically feasible
for their markets." The possibility of greatly. increased signal importa-
tion means royalty fees drawn into the CRT may increase from the
present level of $14 million to upwards of $80 million in as few as five
years.5 8 Add to this a possible increase in current rates because of FCC
deregulation, and the impact of CRT distribution proceeding decisions
becomes clear. 9 The ten employee Tribunal is emerging as the major
counterweight in balancing conflicting interests among key mass com-
munications giants of our age.
V. THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY TRIBUNAL: HOW Is IT WORKING?
On July 25, 1980, the CRT announced its first copyright royalties
distribution decision.6° In arriving at this determination, the CRT con-
ducted evidentiary proceedings and received memoranda from all cate-
gories of claimants concerning fees to which claimants felt entitled, and
a justification for that amount." The remainder of this article outlines
suggestions for improvement in the CRT based in part on evaluation of
the Tribunal by these claimants, their duly authorized representatives
and communications experts.
62
This assessment indicates that the Copyright Royalty Tribunal
ture Association of America, Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 20, 1980) [hereinafter At-
taway).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Johnson, supra note 34.
59. The Tribunal may adjust royalty payments if the FCC changes any of its signal
carriage rules. § 801(b)(2)(B).
60. 45 Fed. Reg. 50,621 (1980).
61. Id.
62. Interviews were conducted by the author with:
Fritz Attaway, Vice-President, Administrative Affairs, Motion Picture Association
of America (MPAA), in Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 1980.
Thomas Brennan, Senior Commissioner, CRT, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 22,
1980, and by telephone, Dec. 20, 1980. 1
Stuart Brotman, President, Communication Strategies, Inc., former Special Assis-
tant to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications & Informa-
tion, National Telecommunications and Information Admin., in Washington,
D.C., Aug. 19, 1980.
Charles Firestone, Adjunct Professor of Law, UCLA; Director, Communications
Law Program, in Honolulu, Hawaii, Dec. 24, 1980.
Hiram Fong, former U.S. Senator from Hawaii, in Honolulu, Hawaii, Dec. 31,
1980.
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should be given: (A) increased authority to carry out its mandate under
the Act; (B) the capacity to set rate and fee schedules; (C) subpoena
power; (D) authorization and funding for an economic study of the
cable-copyright industries, and (E) increased appropriations and staff.
63
A. The authority of the CRT
should be broadened and strengthened
The CRT was created and directed by Congress to effectively ad-
minister the compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act.
64
Yet, given the fact that it has no power to alter rate provisions which
are "frozen in stone" 65 by the statute, the CRT cannot most effectively
function in regard to the equation it regulates between cable, program-
mers and broadcasters.
66
Congress apparently sought to create an agency that was deliber-
ately designed to be without structure,67 and did not intend that the
William Johnson, Chief, Policy Review and Development Division, Cable Bureau,
FCC, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 21, 1980.
Bruce Lehman, Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 22, 1980.
David Lloyd, Counsel for sports claimants before the CRT, Arnold and Porter, in
Washington, D.C., Aug. 22, 1980.
Irene Rypinski, Assistant Professor of Law, former FTC Counsel, in Honolulu,
Hawaii, Dec. 20, 1980.
Arthur Scheiner, Counsel for MPAA before the CRT, in Washington, D.C., Aug.
20, 1980.
63. These are the key changes consistently suggested by interviewees.
64. §§ 801-810.
65. Brennan, supra note 42.
66. Testimony, supra note 26.
It is simply not true, as some have contended, that if copyright owners believe
they are not receiving adequate compensation, that Congress has already provided
a remedy. That was the intention of the original sponsors of the Copyright Act, but
in the process through the two houses, [the CRT's] authority to review the rates has
been greatly diluted. We really have no authority to deal with the basic schedule
other than the inflation adjustment factor. . . . [O]nly if the FCC should modify
the rules and allow additional signal carriage, additional program carriage, [do] we
have full jurisdiction to conduct a proceeding to establish what payments should be
for those purposes. . . . [Other than this there is a rigid structure that cannot be
changed.]
I think the Congress made a mistake when it curtailed our rate review
jurisdiction in cable. This is in contrast to all of the other compulsory licenses
where the Tribunal periodically has jurisdiction to review and possibly adjust the
basic schedule. We do not have that authority with regard to the cable fees. And I
think it was a mistake to deny us that authority.
Id. at 70, 82, 87; See also § 801(b)(2)(B).
67.. See, e.g., S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 802 (1969); Korman, supra note 5 at 22; See
also, Observations, supra note 24, and accompanying text.
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CRT use a scientific approach in its decision making process. 6 How-
ever, the repeal of FCC regulations in the cable area 69 means that the
CRT assumes vital importance as a stabilizing force in the cable-copy-
right arena, an importance unforeseen in 1976 when the Act was
passed.70
B. The CRT Should be Able to Set Rate and Fee Schedules
Distribution of $80 million is inherently more significant in the
commercial world than is distribution of $14 million.7' In addition to
the adjustments allowed the CRT where there is an FCC rule change,72
the CRT may only adjust the statutory rates twice a decade for infla-
tion or deflation. 7" The complete lack of flexibility in the rate setting
domain in effect renders the entire CRT effort an "academic exer-
cise."17 4 Furthermore, even in those areas delineated above where the
Tribunal ostensibly has rate setting autonomy, the statutory rates con-
trol.
75
In November, 1979, Barbara Ringer, the then Register of Copy-
rights, testified before a House subcommittee in charge of copyright,76
urging recognition of a strong and effective CRT.7' She specifically
addressed the need for broader Tribunal authority than is presently
provided in Sections 801(b)(2)(B) and (C), the Act's FCC related provi-
sions.
Total discretion in rate setting without a statutorily imposed
formula of any kind is urged by the MPAA, a major claimant before
the CRT.7 s Rate setting responsibility requires an expert agency with
the ability to constantly respond to changing economic conditions, "an
expertise which Congress does not have."7 9
68. Johnson, supra note 34.
69. FCC Now All But Out of Cable Business, supra note 52.
70. Brennan, supra note 42.
71. Johnson, supra note 34; Interview with David Lloyd, Counsel for sports claimants
before the Tribunal, Arnold and Porter, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 22, 1980) [hereinafter
Lloyd].
72. § 801(b)(2)(B).
73. § 801(b)(2)(A).
74. Brennan, supra note 42.
75. id See also, § 801 supra note 54.
76. Hearings on Copyright Issues Cable Television and Performance Rights Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979).
77. Ringer, supra note 6 at 31.
78. Attaway, supra note 55.
79. Id.
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Whether Congress in fact lacks the necessary expertise is question-
able. But it is unreasonable for Congress to assume the burden of peri-
odic review of statutory cable royalty rates, where these rate reviews
require a great deal of expertise but are not of direct interest to most
citizens.80 In addition, Congress' history of attending to the rate adjust-
ment process with an earlier compulsory license-the mechanical com-
pulsory license-is dismal. Until the copyright revision was completed
in 1976, the 1909 statutory fee of two cents remained unchanged. 8t
The "protracted and acrimonious history"82 of the Act explains a
professed reticence on the part of many Congressmen to undertake re-
vision of the Copyright Act, so soon after the cable-copyright conflict
achieved a long-sought compromise.8" However, revision of the Act to
create a strong and effective Tribunal is in the self-interest of all par-
ties. First, it is in the cable industry's interest to remove the stigma of
asserted unfairness that currently characterizes the fees paid by the
cable industry.84 Second, it is in the interest of all broadcast related
industries to have an impartial decisionmaker, the CRT, evaluate the
rate setting issue that has been buried under a barrage of broadcast and
program suppliers' lobbying efforts. 5 These efforts have created the
general impression that copyright royalty fees are "scandalously
low." 86 The Tribunal must be empowered with sufficient authority to
80. Korman, supra note 5 at 17.
81. Id.
82. Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 951
(1977). quoting Senator John C. McClellan introducing the Senate Conference Report on
copyright law revision, in 122 CONG. REc. 33,813 (1976).
83. Interview with Bruce Lehman, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties. and the Administration of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 22, 1980) [hereinafter Lehman].
84. Kachigian, The New Copyright Law and Cable Television, Interpretation and implica-
tions, 7 PERFORMING ARTS REV. 176, 194 (1977). ". . . (t]he view of cable television as a
'parasite' should end." Id. at 194. See also Attaway, supra note 55; Lloyd, supra note 71.
85. See generall,, Adding Insult to Injury: CRT Gives Only 3.25% to Broadcasters,
BROADCASTING, Aug. 4, 1980 at 28; Valenti, Cable T- 4 Dangerous License, Washington
Star, Aug. 6, 1980, § A, at 15, col. 1; Tighten Up on Cable, BROADCASTING, Jul. 3, 1978 at 67;
Upping Cable's Bill?, BROADCASTING, Sep. 25, 1978 at 7; Independent Producers See Harm
From Cable Importation, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Mar. 28, 1979, at 10.
86. Johnson, supra note 34. William Johnson, Chief of the FCC Cable Television Policy
Review Division, indicated that this impression may be without foundation:
Broadcasters and the MPAA have persuaded everyone that the [royalty] fees
are too low. They state that they pay X% of broadcast revenues for programs while
cable pays such a small amount in comparison that it is essentially nothing ....
But this compares apples and oranges. It is an inappropriate comparison ....
The cable subscriber fee is not all for distant signal; some parts [of cable subscriber
revenues] are for clearer pictures, for the news ticker-tape, or other local services
.... Only a miniscule amount of subscriber revenues may be for the distant sig-
1981]
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truly protect the public interest.8 7 To give the public a full range of
signals will require fair compensation to copyright owners. If the com-
pulsory license fee is to achieve this end, the Tribunal requires the
power to adjust the cable royalty fee schedule.
C The CRT Should be Given Subpoena Power
The Senate bill that first conceived of the CRT88 included a provi-
sion for subpoena power which inadvertently was deleted when the
House bill reformulated the CRT provisions.89 The House version ap-
plied the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the authors errone-
ously assumed that subpoena power was automatically conferred, not
realizing that the APA only regulates its exercise if it is present in the
organic act itself."0 The lack of subpoena power has been a major
nal. . . .Before we can give copyright owners the money they deserve it must be
known. . . what part of the cable subscription audience is for distant signal.
Id.
87. Johnson, supra note 34; Interview with Irene Rypinski, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Hawaii School of Law; formerly in the practice of antitrust law with the firm
of Bergson, Borkland, Margolis and Adler, Washington, D.C. and counsel in the Federal
Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on the industry-wide investigation of media
concentration; in Honolulu, Hawaii (Dec. 20, 1980):
It may once have been, or may still be appropriate (or consistent with the
public interest) for broadcasters to subsidize cable in the form of nominal fees and
compulsory fees. The equity of this arrangement may derive in part from the fact
that cable development has long been constrained in the interest of broadcast.
However, once cable congeals.and attains stability, the public interest will have less
to do with assuring cable viability, than with giving both broadcasters and cable
operators the incentive to disseminate diverse, high quality programming.
Copyright fees may have to be raised, and compulsory licensing requirements
may have to be eliminated or limited to assure that cable does not merely offer
"more of the same," which would make a limited contribution to the public inter-
est, in "the free flow of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" (A.rsoci-
atedPress v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). Allowing cable to remain a parasite on
broadcast may also simply encourage broadcasters to acquire cable outlets, further
reducing the diversity of information sources, and perhaps programming as well.
That the Tribunal's lack of discretion risks an inadequate response to the pub-
lic interest as it evolves is at least arguable, based on the difficulties that Congress
has had in facing copyright issues. Of course, increasing the Tribunal's discretion
would also create risks; the question of compensation may be addressed in terms of
political strength rather than public interest. This danger can be alleviated by es-
tablishing standards to govern the Tribunal's decisions regarding rates.
Id.; Interview with Charles Firestone, Adjunct Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law;
Director, UCLA Communications Law Program; Faculty Advisor, Federal Communica-
tions Law Journal, in Honolulu, Hawaii (Dec. 24, 1980).
88. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (Committee Print), §§ 801-807; Brennan,
supra note 42.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1976); Lehman, supra note 83;
Brennan, supra note 42.
90. Brennan, supra note 42; 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(d) and 556(c) (1976). "Subject topublished
rules of the agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may .. issue
subpoenas authorized by law (emphasis added). Id. § 556(c).
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handicap to the CRT.9 Without subpoena power, the Tribunal refuses
to direct a party to furnish supporting data to opposing counsel, pre-
sumably on the theory that it does not have the power to do so.92
D. The CRT Should be Given Authorization and Fundingfor an
Economic Study of the Cable-Copyright Industries
Neither scientific nor empirical data were utilized in creating the
copyright royalty fee schedule. 93 Instead, the schedule was the result of
an industry compromise among cable-broadcast and MPAA forces.
94
Without the data it needs to make impartial decisions, the Tribunal
must depend totally on the information provided to it by claimants."
But the cable industry is not a claimant and does not appear before the
CRT under its current structure,96 thus seriously skewing the Tribu-
nal's perspective. The statute should be revised to vest the CRT with
the authority to collect essential empirical data and conduct analysis
necessary for equitable decision making.
E The CRT Should be Given Increased Appropriations and Staff
The mandate of the Tribunal inherently requires an adversarial
format and knowledge and experience with conducting administrative
hearings. For the most part, the Commissioners lack this experience. 97
Furthermore, because Commissioners do not have staff98 or resources
91. Brennan, supra note 42.
92. Interview with Arthur Scheiner, Wilner and Scheiner, Counsel for MPAA before the
Tribunal. in Washington. D.C. (Aug. 20. 1980) (hereinafter Scheiner]. Arthur Scheiner, an
attorney who regularly appears before the CRT objects to its strict interpretation of the
oversight.
If the CRT has the power to direct an adversarial proceeding as it obviously
does, it also has the clear authority to direct a party to make available whatever
underlying evidence and materials are necessary to establish its case.
Id.
93. Testimony, supra note 26 at 2.
94. See Ringer, supra, note 6 at 18.
95. 468 PAT., T.M. AND COPYRIGHT 1. (BNA) A-13 (1980).
96. Johnson, supra note 34.
97. Scheiner, supra note 92; Lloyd, supra note 71. Both attorneys explained that
Thomas Brennan is highly qualified, but all his experience is "on the Hill" and except for
Commissioners Clarence James and Thomas Brennan there are no other attorneys on the
CRT. No one except Brennan has prior copyright related experience and none of the indi-
viduals are experienced with administrative hearing procedures. But cf., Brennan, supra
note 42, where he says that the non-legal backgrounds of some of the Commissioners are
useful in providing a variety of viewpoints.
98. Originally the CRT was promised funding to bring in special consultants. When this
was not forthcoming, the Chairman made a request for consultant assistance to Congress,
but was denied. Brennan, supra note 42.
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to augment, verify, or analyze data provided by claimants, their deci-
sions suffer.99 The Tribunal's determinations have been criticized as
being "too cryptic... , one-liners. . . , often lacking sufficient expla-
" 100nation or objective foundation ....
Some attorneys who represent clients before the CRT believe its
structure should be changed to include an administrative law judge
who could hear evidence and write a recommended decision.' 0' Parties
who wanted to take exception could appeal to the Tribunal and let the
full body of commissioners make the decision. But if the CRT's pres-
ent structure is going to be maintained, the Tribunal should receive
additional funding for consultants or legal advisors on specific, com-
plex matters.'0 2
Congress did not anticipate the FCC repeal of its distant signal
importation and syndicated exclusivity rules and the likely "crush of
work" this will bring to the CRT.10 3 The Tribunal is not staffed or
equipped to handle the expected onslaught of new claims. 'I Addition-
ally, the CRT suffers more from "across the board" budget cuts than
other agencies, because it already functions so "close to the line." 05 In
99. Johnson, supra note 34.
100. Scheiner, supra note 92.
Orders of the CRT are very cryptic. . . (E.g.], after Interim Decision, Phase 1,
for group claimants. . . only one page was issued. . . with one-line statements of
explanation. . . . Terms for.determining awards were very subjective: . . . two of
the factors applied were "quality of copyrighted program material"... and "time-
related considerations." (See 45 Fed. Reg. 63,036 (1980).) What do these terms
mean . . .? Such subjective standards pose serious First Amendment questions.
Why not use objective standards like the Nielsen ratings, arbitration and other
industry sources. ..
Id.
101. Lloyd, supra note 71. A representative of sports claimants before the CRT ex-
plained:
It should not be necessary for five members of the Tribunal to sit in a hearing
room. . . . They've been there more than 72 days this year--that's three months
each of them is out of play for anything else . . . . They need to study position
papers and keep informed . . . . It strikes me as a massive waste of time. . . . It
would be far more efficient to use an administrative law judge .
Id.
102. Lloyd, supra note 71. "If you are going to have individuals without a strong, work-
ing legal knowledge dealing with legal matters, they ought to have the assistance they need
.Id.
103. Brennan, supra note 42.
104. Ringer, supra note 6 at 22-23.
105. Brennan, supra note 42; Second interview with Thomas Brennan by telephone (Dec.
20, 1980). Funds are so tight that CRT Commissioners must think twice before "taking a
taxi up to the Hill." Commissioner Brennan described the lack of funding as severe. It has
necessitated terminating discovery and proceedings prematurely. ". . . (W)e had to jeop-
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light of these considerations adequate funding and staff should be pro-
vided to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal without delay.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal should be given the opportunity
to prove that it can perform. Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copy-
rights, told Congress in testimony before the House subcommittee in
charge of copyright:
You created the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. . . .Their
crunch is coming . . . in 1980 . . We will know a great
deal more about whether or not it is able to function, under
the constraints it is now given. . . .[Y]ou created this body
with the thought of trying to make the adjustments, the fine
tuning that was necessary under the cable provisions you
adopted. . . .The CRT should be given an opportunity to
function .... 106
The Tribunal is ready for appraisal. It is the challenge of Con-
gress to look beyond the highly entrenched and protectionist stances of
the cable, program syndication and broadcasting interests in making
such an appraisal. For example, what is the capacity of the CRT to
respond to change; to protect the public interest; to maintain its inde-
pendence? Answers to these and other questions ultimately will shape
the Tribunal and through it the communications transformations of our
age.
The ultimate goal must be the public good. What is needed is a
mass communications "community" where both a strong broadcast sys-
tem and a strong cable system co-exist; where greater cable penetration
increases markets for the mutual benefit of broadcast and program sup-
plier industries; where technological growth is rewarded with proper
recompense; where the public gains. Hopefully, with additional Con-
gressional attention to the issues noted in this comment, the CRT will
produce long term equity among the competing interests its regulates.
ardize a week or ten days of hearings because we just did not have the funds to pay for
transcripts."
Members of the legal community who deal with the CRT expressed amazement at the
shoestring operation of the agency. See Johnson, supra note 34. "1 called up on the phone
...and Brennan answered himself! It's like calling the FCC and having Charlie Ferris
answer. . .! They have no assistance .
106. Ringer, supra note 6 at 31.
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The Copyright Royalty Tribunal can achieve this fundamental equilib-
rium and serve as a vital axis upon which our nation's media revolution
revolves.
Yvonne Efisabeth Choizen *
* Member, Class of 1981, University of Hawaii, School of Law; former guest transfer
student, Loyola Law School at Los Angeles.
This comment has been entered in the 1981 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition,
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. The author
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[Vol. I
